According to those concerned about a balanced EU budget, the fact that the bloc will use its own money to support Ukraine instead of frozen Russian assets constitutes a missed opportunity. However, a careful analysis of this pivotal moment in Europe’s response to the Russia-Ukraine war suggests that the situation around the €90 billion loan to Ukraine is much more than just a missed opportunity. It is, in fact, a matter of influence.
The EU’s decision to grant Ukraine a €90 billion loan from European sources may be an ill-considered move, but in a broader context, it suggests that Russia, despite everything, still retains its influence in Europe.
Using the EU’s collective debt to support a third country is an unusual move for the EU, yet the bloc’s leadership ultimately decided to do so, ignoring the many arguments against such a step while maintaining the old taboo regarding frozen Russian assets.
The EU holds nearly 80% of the G7’s Russian sovereign assets (approximately €210 billion) primarily through the Belgian Euroclear and Luxembourg-based Clearstream depositories. So far, Brussels has focused only on redirecting the roughly €3 billion in annual windfall profits generated by these assets, while leaving the assets themselves untouched, Ukrainian Pravda writes adding that with the adoption of the Ukraine Support Loan, the political momentum to mobilize these funds has effectively dissipated.
The main problem with the €90 billion loan is that the EU has secured short-term relief for Kyiv, but at the cost of abandoning a potentially game-changing plan, the so-called EU Reparation Loan, first mentioned by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in September 2025.
As for the €90 billion package, it is to address Ukraine’s urgent financial needs. It was agreed in December 2025 by EU heads of states but was blocked by Hungary’s veto. Although the Hungarian veto was lifted following a change of government in Hungary in April, success is still fragile as some member states including Bulgaria (which new leader, Rumen Radev is known as a Kremlin-friendly politician), Slovakia and Czechia can still obstruct this initiative.
The lessons to be learned from the example of financial support for Ukraine is that, rather than sticking to the clear principle of ‘Russia should pay for the damage it has caused’, the EU has intentionally chosen a different path for Ukraine’s post-war recovery and has offered Kyiv its own limited re-sources. As a result, support for Ukraine, including the allocation of €90 billion to the country, has become even more fragile and uncertain than before, while frozen Russian assets remain untouched.
In other words, the EU has offered its own assets to a third – candidate – country at a time when its possibilities to secure financing Ukraine are limited, even insufficient, not to mention the fact that given the rapidly changing geopolitical situation, it can rely only on itself, both in political and economic terms.
The question is why Brussels has chosen to go this senseless path, given that what could have been a game changer for the EU and Ukraine has instead turned out to be a turning point in favor of Russia.
Given the vast sums of financial support provided to Ukraine by the EU in recent years which have disappeared as a result of numerous corruption cases, how else can the EU’s decision to provide further support to Ukraine using its own resources – rather than frozen assets of the Central Bank of Russia be described other than as a result of Russia’s continuing influence in Europe…?
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